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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a public interest, law and
policy center with supporters in all 50 states. WLF regularly appears before
federal and state courts to promote economic liberty, free enterprise, and a limited
and accountable government. In particular, WLF routinely litigates in support of
efforts to ensure a strict separation of powers—both among the three branches of
the federal government and between federal and state governments—as a means of
preventing too much power from being concentrated within a single governmental
body.
The remaining amici are all legal scholars specializing in constitutional law
and related fields. Based on their substantial legal expertise, they believe that
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds the bounds
of Congress’s constitutional authority. Amici include Jonathan Adler, Professor of
Law and Director, Center of Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law; George Dent, Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law,
Case Western University School of Law; Michael Distelhorst, Professor of Law,
Capital University Law School; James W. Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor

1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c), amici state that no
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person or
entity, other than amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. All parties to this dispute
have consented to the filing of this brief.
1
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of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt University Law School; Elizabeth Price Foley,
Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; David Kopel,
Research Director of the Independence Institute and Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Kurt Lash, Alumni Distinguished
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Program on Constitutional Theory,
History and Law, University of Illinois College of Law; David N. Mayer, Professor
of Law and History, Capital University Law School; Andrew Morris, University of
Alabama School of Law; Leonard J. Nelson III, Professor of Law, Samford
University’s Cumberland School of Law; Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger
Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law; Ronald J.
Rychlak, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University
of Mississippi School of Law; Steven J. Willis, Professor of Law, University of
Florida Levin College of Law; and, Todd J. Zywicki, Foundation Professor of
Law, George Mason University School of Law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court’s grant of summary judgment below should be affirmed.
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which seeks to
compel most Americans to purchase health insurance by 2014, goes well beyond
any previous exercise of federal authority. See §1501(b), 10106, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”). Even the broadest Supreme Court

2
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precedents interpreting the limits of federal power do not give Congress the
authority to force Americans to purchase a product they do not want.2
The “first principles” of the Constitution are that it “creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45). As James Madison observed, “‘[t]he
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite.’” Id. The federal government, Madison emphasized, is not granted
“an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39.
These foundational principles are both vindicated and preserved by the district
court’s ruling below.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate “economic
activity” and “noneconomic activity” when controlling the latter is “an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (quoting Lopez). But nothing
in the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents gives Congress the power to force
private citizens to engage in economic transactions they would prefer to avoid.
2

This brief addresses only the Secretary’s Commerce Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause arguments. WLF has previously addressed, in the district court
below, the Secretary’s Taxing Clause arguments. See Amicus Br. of Wash. Legal
Found. & Const. Law Scholars, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 2010 WL
3952344, at *17-20 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2010).

3
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Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the
Commerce Clause power, the Secretary argues that the individual mandate actually
regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.”
Appellant’s Br. at 34. Yet the individual mandate regulates neither consumption
nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured Americans
whether or not they consume health care services. If the individual mandate
operated as the Secretary claims, one could simply avoid the mandate by not
consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not allowed under Section
1501.
If, as the Secretary suggests, the Commerce power extends to all economic
decisions as well as all economic activities, Congress would enjoy unlimited
authority to mandate any behavior of any kind. After all, any decision to do (or not
do) virtually anything has some economic impact. Nor is there any special
attribute of the health care market that makes refusal to purchase health insurance
more of an “economic activity” than any other decision to refrain from purchasing
any other product.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause precedents give
Congress wide latitude to determine what kinds of regulations are “necessary” to
the implementation of Congress’s other enumerated powers. See, e.g., M’Culloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819) (ruling that such measures

4
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need not be “absolutely necessary,” but merely “useful” or “convenient” to the
execution of other powers). But they do not give Congress the kind of sweeping
power asserted by the Secretary in this case. Indeed, the individual mandate runs
afoul of at least three of the five criteria for evaluating Necessary and Proper
Clause cases recently utilized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). Comstock cited five factors in justifying its decision to
uphold a claim of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
“(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal
involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light
of the government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers
posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state
interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.” Id. at 1965. A majority of these
criteria weigh against the individual mandate.
Section 1501 also violates the Necessary and Proper Clause’s requirement
that legislation authorized by it must be “proper.” Historical evidence suggests
that “proper” legislation at the very least must not upset the constitutional balance
of power between the federal and state governments by giving Congress virtually
unlimited authority. The logic of the Secretary’s argument for the individual
mandate does just that.

5
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY
CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court divides Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers into three categories: (1) regulation of “the use of the channels of
interstate commerce”; (2) “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) “regulat[ion] [of] . . .
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558-59; Morrison, 559 U.S. at 609.
The individual mandate clearly does not fall under either the first or second
of these categories. The decision not to purchase health insurance does not involve
“the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
Similarly, the mandate is not an example of “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce.” Id. The status of being uninsured is neither an instrumentality of
interstate commerce, nor is it a person or thing that travels in interstate commerce.
The Secretary’s Commerce Clause argument instead hinges on the third
category—regulation of “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”
6
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The fatal flaw in the Secretary’s position is that none of the Supreme Court
precedents interpreting the Commerce Clause allow Congress to force ordinary
individuals to engage in commercial activity.
A.

Existing Commerce Clause Precedents Do Not Give Congress The
Power To Regulate Mere Inactivity.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Commerce Clause

does not grant Congress unlimited power. “The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of
legislation.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (“Even
under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’
regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.”).
Even the broadest judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause do not
give Congress the power to regulate inactivity. Instead, they strictly limit
Congress’s authority to the regulation of “economic activity” and noneconomic
activity whose restriction is necessary for the implementation of a regulatory
scheme aimed at controlling interstate commercial transactions.
1. Gonzales v. Raich.
The Supreme Court’s most expansive Commerce Clause precedent to date,
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), illustrates this point well. Raich was the
first and only case where the Court upheld the regulation of intrastate,
noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause. Raich ruled that Congress’s
7
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power to regulate interstate commerce could justify a federal ban on the possession
of medical marijuana that had never been sold in any market or left the state where
it was grown. Id. Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson grew marijuana
solely for personal consumption for medical purposes. Id. at 7. Despite the lack of
any direct involvement in commerce, the Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce
Clause gave Congress the power to forbid this activity. Although the Secretary
relies heavily on Raich, see Appellant’s Br. at 30-39, the decision fails to justify
the individual mandate.
Raich interprets Congress’s Commerce power expansively in three ways: by
allowing Congress broad authority to regulate “economic activity”; by permitting
regulation of noneconomic activity as part of a broader regulatory scheme aimed at
interstate commercial activity; and, by applying a “rational basis” test. But none of
these three features of Raich supports the argument that the Commerce Clause
authorizes congressional regulation of an individual’s decision not to engage in
commercial activity.
a. The individual mandate does not regulate “economic activity.”
Raich reaffirmed that Congress has the power to regulate “economic
activity.” It adopted a broad definition of “economics,” which “refers to ‘the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at
25-26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).

8
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Expansive as this definition may be, an individual’s mere status of being uninsured
does not qualify. Choosing not to purchase health insurance involves neither
production, nor distribution, nor consumption of commodities. Indeed, an
individual who chooses not to purchase insurance has chosen not to consume or
distribute the commodity in question. Obviously, he or she is also not “producing”
any commodity by refusing to purchase insurance. By contrast, the Raich
defendants were engaged in “economic activity” since they were both producing
and consuming marijuana. Id. at 7, 25-26.
b. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as a regulation of
noneconomic activity necessary to implement a broader
regulatory scheme.
Like Lopez and Morrison before it, Raich indicates that “Congress may
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 37; see also Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. But as all three cases demonstrate, this
power applies only to the regulation of “noneconomic activity.” Id. It does not
cover regulation of inactivity or the refusal to engage in economic transactions.
Angel Raich and Diane Monsen had not been inactive or merely refused to engage
in some transaction. To the contrary, they were actively involved in the production
and consumption of medical marijuana.
If Raich were interpreted to permit regulation of mere inactivity, Congress

9
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would have the power to compel any citizen to help enforce its regulatory schemes.
It could force individuals to purchase General Motors cars in order to assist the
struggling auto industry, or purchase financial products from banks that received
federal bailout funds. By the same token, Congress could require individuals to
purchase products from any industry with political clout. Similarly, it could
require individuals to purchase memberships in exercise clubs in order to increase
their physical fitness, which in turn would increase their economic productivity
and stimulate interstate commerce. See John H. Kerr & Marjolein C. H. Vos,
Employee Fitness Programmes, Absenteeism, and General Well-Being, 7 WORK &
STRESS 179 (1993) (providing evidence that employee physical fitness reduces
absenteeism and increases productivity).
In sum, there is no limit to the regulatory authority Congress could claim
under the Sectretary’s sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The
federal government would have the power to force citizens to engage in any
activity that might conceivably affect commerce in some way. This is precisely
the kind of unconstrained police power that the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (noting that “the police power” is “denied
the National Government and reposed in the States”).
c. Raich’s rational basis test does not apply to this case.
Raich applied the deferential “rational basis” test to the government’s

10
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claims, ruling that “[w]e need not determine whether [defendants’] activities, taken
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. The Secretary
claimed below that the rational basis test should be applied in the present case as
well, see J.A. at 67-71, and she repeats this argument in her opening brief on
appeal. See Appellant’s Br. at 20 (“Congress had far more than a rational basis for
its finding that such consumption of health care services without insurance
substantially affects interstate commerce.”).
But the Raich Court nowhere indicated that the rational basis test is
applicable in a case where the government seeks to regulate inactivity, as opposed
to some sort of positive action. Rather, the Court explicitly noted that the test
applied to the government’s regulation of Raich and Monsen’s “activities, taken in
the aggregate.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
The Secretary appears to assume that Congress’s mere assertion of
Commerce Clause authority is enough to trigger application of the rational basis
test. But neither Raich nor any previous Supreme Court precedent states any such
thing. To the contrary, Raich applied the standard only to a regulation of
“activity.”
Neither Lopez nor Morrison applied the deferential rational basis test,
despite the government’s invocation of the Commerce Clause. In Morrison, the

11
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Court struck down the challenged section of the Violence Against Women Act
despite the fact that the claim of a substantial impact on interstate commerce was
“supported by numerous [congressional] findings” that would have been more than
enough to pass muster under the rational basis approach. Morrison, 529 U.S. at
614. Although Morrison did not explicitly reject the rational basis test, the Court’s
failure to apply the test and its imposition of a considerably higher standard of
scrutiny strongly suggest that, at the very least, rational basis analysis does not
apply to regulations of intrastate noneconomic activity such as gun possession in a
school zone (the regulated activity in Lopez) or sexual violence (Morrison).
Indeed, both Lopez and Morrison emphasized that “‘simply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” Lopez, 514 U.S., at 557 (quoting
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614
(quoting identical language from Lopez). Had Lopez and Morrison applied the
rational basis test, these decisions would inevitably have gone the other way. In
Morrison, Congress had compiled extensive evidence of possible effects of genderbased violence on interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. In Lopez,
Justice Breyer’s dissent indicated a variety of ways in which a rational basis
existed for believing that gun possession in school zones might have such effects.

12
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer pointed out,
if we “ask whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a
significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and
interstate commerce . . . the answer to this question must be yes.” Id. at 618. If
the rational basis test does not apply to regulation of noneconomic intrastate
activity (as in Lopez and Morrison), it surely cannot apply to attempts to reach
mere inactivity.
2.

Other Commerce Clause precedents do not support the
Secretary’s position.

The Supreme Court’s pre-Raich Commerce Clause precedents provide even
less support than Raich for the Secretary’s position. As the Court pointed out five
years before Raich in Morrison, “in every case” where it has “sustained federal
regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on
interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic
endeavor” and had a “commercial character.” 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), a case relied on by the Secretary,
see Appellant’s Br. at 45-46, was one of the Supreme Court’s broadest
interpretations of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Yet its facts
differ radically from those of the present case. Wickard upheld the application of
the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act’s restrictions on wheat production as applied
to Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer who produced wheat for consumption on his
13
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own farm. 317 U.S. at 115, 121-27. The Court noted that restriction of homegrown, home-consumed wheat was a necessary component of Congress’s scheme
to “raise the market price of wheat” because in the absence of regulation, homegrown wheat could serve as a substitute for wheat sold in the market and depress
demand for the latter. Id. at 127-29.
Unlike the instant case, Wickard addressed a regulation of clearly economic
activity. Roscoe Filburn sold “a portion of [his wheat] crop” on the market and
“fe[d] part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold.” Id. at 114.
Filburn’s wheat production was unquestionably part of a commercial enterprise
that sold goods in interstate commerce. As the Court noted in Lopez, Wickard
“involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone
does not.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Until Raich, all of the Court’s other post-New Deal decisions sustaining
exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause addressed
regulations of economic activity involving the sale or production of goods or
services.3 Unlike the individual mandate, these laws clearly regulated preexisting

3

See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-280 (upholding regulation of commercial
mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding regulation of
commercial loan sharking); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110
(1942) (upholding regulation of price of milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act regulation of employment
conditions); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding
National Labor Relations Act regulation of employment relations).
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commercial activity.
Nor is the individual mandate analogous to those cases upholding civil
rights statutes that ban racial discrimination by motels and restaurants. See
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding regulation of
discrimination against customers of a commercial restaurant); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal ban on
discrimination against customers of a hotel serving interstate travelers). Such
federal antidiscrimination laws apply only to preexisting businesses engaged in
commercial activity in a regulated industry. By contrast, uninsured individuals are,
by definition, not participating in the insurance business. Thus, the individual
mandate is actually analogous to a statute that requires individuals to patronize a
restaurant or hotel even if they had no previous intention of doing so. See Ilya
Somin, The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and the Constitutional Text,
ENGAGE, Vol. 11, No. 1, Mar. 2010, at 49.
B.

The Status of Being Uninsured Is Not An Economic Activity.
Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the

Commerce Clause power, the Secretary argues that the individual mandate actually
regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.”
Appellant’s Br. at 34. Yet the individual mandate purports to regulate neither
consumption nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured
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Americans whether or not they ever consume health care services. If the
individual mandate operated as the Secretary claims, one could simply avoid the
mandate by not consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not
allowed under Section 1501.
The Secretary attempts to circumvent the constitutional bar on Commerce
Clause regulation of inactivity by claiming that the state of being uninsured
eventually qualifies as activity under Supreme Court precedent. This argument
comes in two forms: a broad version claiming that any “economic decision” can be
regulated under the Commerce Clause, and a narrow one focusing on supposedly
unique characteristics of the health care market. Both versions fail for similar
reasons: they end up giving Congress unconstrained power to mandate virtually
anything, something the Supreme Court has repeatedly said is impermissible.
1. Economic decisions are not economic activities.
The broad version of the Secretary’s argument claims that any decision with
economic effects qualifies as an economic activity. See Appellant’s Br. at 47 (“But
that type of economic preference is plainly subject to regulation under the
Commerce Clause.”). The Secretary cites with approval a district court decision
upholding the mandate on the grounds that the Commerce Clause reaches not
merely economic activity but economic choices. See id. (citing Liberty Univ. Inc.
v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010)). This recent
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decision by the Western District of Virginia concludes that “decisions to pay for
health care without insurance are economic activities . . . . Because of the nature
of supply and demand, plaintiffs’ choices directly affect the price of insurance in
the market, which Congress set out in the Act to control.” Liberty Univ., 2010 WL
4860299, at *15.
The flaw in this argument is obvious. The “nature of supply and demand”
means that any decision to do or not do anything will directly affect the price of
some good or service. If someone chooses not to purchase a car, that will affect
the price of cars. If a person chooses to sleep for an hour rather than work, he will
earn less money, which in turn means that he will engage in less consumer
spending or investment, which will affect the prices of various goods. By this
reasoning, Congress could not only force people to purchase any product of any
kind, it could force them to engage in just about any other kind of activity that
affects the price of some good or service that Congress sets out to control.
The Secretary’s “economic decisions” doctrine also contravenes Supreme
Court precedent. Under this approach, Lopez would have been decided the other
way. Carrying a gun into a school zone—the action forbidden by the Gun Free
School Zones Act invalidated in that case—is clearly an “economic decision”
under the Secretary’s reasoning. In the aggregate, such actions surely have an
effect on prices in various markets, including the market for guns and the market
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for illegal drugs in schools. Indeed, Alfonso Lopez was paid $40 to carry his gun
in a school zone for the purpose of transferring it to a member of a drug gang who
probably intended to use it to defend the group’s commercial interests in a “gang
war.” United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
2. No unique feature of the health insurance market transforms being
uninsured into economic activity.
In addition to insisting that Congress can regulate any “economic decision,”
the Secretary also argues that the individual mandate regulates an “activity”
because of the special nature of the health care market: “The means that Congress
adopted to achieve [healthcare reform] are adapted to the unique conditions of the
national market for health care services. Participation in the market is nearly
universal.” Appellant’s Br. at 19-20.
Since everyone eventually participates in the health care market, the
Secretary reasons, choosing not to buy health insurance does not constitute
inactivity. Rather, it is an economic decision to try to consume health care services
later without paying for them. See id. at 20 (“When that need arises, individuals
depend on the extensive medical infrastructure financed and sustained by other
participants in the health care services market.”).
In reality, it is simply not true that everyone consumes health care. Some
people rely on charity or home remedies, while others never get sick enough to
18
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require medical treatment before they die. Still, it may well be true that the
overwhelming majority of people participate in the health care market in
some way. But this does not differentiate health care from virtually any other
market.
If the relevant “market” is defined broadly enough, one can characterize any
decision not to purchase a good or service exactly the same way. The Secretary
does not claim that everyone will inevitably use health insurance. Instead, she
defines the market as “health care services.” Id. (emphasis added). The same
sleight of hand works for virtually any other mandate Congress might care to
impose. As the district court below properly noted, “the same reasoning could
apply to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions. This broad definition of
the economic activity subject to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation
and is unsupported by [the Supreme Court’s] Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”
J.A. at 1097.
Consider the case of a mandate requiring everyone to purchase General
Motors cars in order to help the auto industry. There are many people who do not
participate in the market for cars. But just about everyone participates in the
market for “transportation.” In the words of the Secretary, “[w]hen
[transportation] need[s] arise[], individuals depend on the extensive
[transportation] infrastructure financed and sustained by other participants in the
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[transportation] services market.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. After all, everyone
moves from place to place in some way.
The same logic can be used to justify virtually any other mandate Congress
might care to impose—even a mandate requiring everyone to see the most recent
Harry Potter movie. After all, just about everyone participates in the market for
entertainment. Choosing not to go to the movies is just an “economic decision” to
try to pay for other entertainment services later.
The same flaw undermines the claim that health care is distinctive because
service providers are sometimes required to provide free care. See, e.g., Mead v.
Holder, Civ. No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
The only reason why that difference may be constitutionally relevant is that failing
to purchase health insurance has adverse economic effects on producers. But, in
that respect, failing to purchase insurance turns out to be no different from failing
to purchase any other product. Whenever someone fails to purchase a product,
producers are made economically worse off than they would be if the potential
buyer had made a different decision.
Health insurance is undoubtedly an important good. But it has no unique
characteristics that transform failure to purchase it into an “economic activity.”
II.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE.
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to “make all
20
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Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Supreme Court has described the Clause as “the last,
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.” Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997). If the individual mandate cannot be upheld
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot salvage it.
The Secretary contends that the individual mandate is permissible under the
Necessary and Proper Clause because it is needed to effectuate the PPACA’s
regulations forcing insurance companies to accept customers with preexisting
health conditions, which in turn is an exercise of Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause. In its amicus brief opposing the Secretary’s motion for
dismissal below, WLF provided a detailed argument against the claim that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate. See Amicus Br.
of Wash. Legal Found., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 2661289
(E.D. Va. June 18, 2010). Amici incorporate those legal arguments by reference
here.
Here, we emphasize two critical points: that the individual mandate runs
afoul of the standards for Necessary and Proper Clause claims established by the
Supreme Court in its recent decision in United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949
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(2010), and that it fails the requirement that any exercise of federal power under
the Clause be “proper” as well as “necessary.”
A.

The Scope Of The Necessary And Proper Clause.
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a free-standing grant of power.

Instead, it gives Congress only the authority to enact legislation that “carr[ies] into
Execution” other powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle,
emphasizing that “every . . . statute” authorized by the Necessary and Proper
Clause “must itself be legitimately predicated on an enumerated power.”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964; see also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247-48
(1960) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause “by itself, creates no
constitutional power”).
But even if a statute in fact helps to execute an enumerated power, it still
may not be authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In its famous ruling in
M’Culloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court outlined several constraints on
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
constitutional.
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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This passage outlines four constraints on the range of statutes authorized by
the Necessary and Proper Clause: (1) the “end” pursued must be “legitimate” and
“within the scope of the constitution”; (2) the means must be “appropriate” and
“plainly adapted to that end”; (3) the means must “not [be] prohibited” elsewhere
in the Constitution; and, finally (4) the means must be “consist[ent] with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.” A statute that is “improper” in nature can be
rejected as inconsistent “with the letter and spirit of the Constitution” or because it
is “inappropriate.”
B.

The Individual Mandate Fails The Five-Part Test Adopted By The
Supreme Court In United States v. Comstock.
In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court held that Section 4248 of

the Adam Walsh Act was valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-67. That provision gave federal prison officials the
power to detain “sexually dangerous” federal prisoners after the completion of
their sentences. See 42 U.S.C. § 4248. The Court cited five factors justifying its
decision to uphold Section 4248: “(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound
reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest
in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.” Id.
at 1965.
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A majority of these criteria weigh against the individual mandate: the lack of
a deep history of federal involvement, the failure of the PPACA to accommodate
state interests, and the statute’s extraordinarily broad scope. A fourth factor (the
possible lack of “sound reasons” for the statute’s enactment) is potentially
ambiguous. The fifth—“the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause”—is a
constant that does not vary from case to case. See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of
Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power,
2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 260-67 (assessing implications of Comstock for
the present case).
1.

No deep history exists of the federal government’s compelling
individuals to purchase insurance products against their will.

As the district court emphasized below, the “congressional enactment under
review . . . literally forges new ground.” J.A. at 315. There is no history of
comparable federal regulation. Although the federal government has adopted
numerous previous statutes regulating health care, it has never compelled ordinary
citizens to purchase health insurance or other health care products. It has never
forced citizens to purchase products of any kind merely as a consequence of their
status as residents of the United States. See J.A. at 322 (“Never before has the
Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this
far.”). Nor have the courts ever previously sustained such a statute.
Comstock relied on a 155-year history of federal involvement in the relevant
24
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field. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958-59 (tracing the relevant history of federal
involvement back to 1855). There is no similarly extensive history of previous
federal regulation remotely comparable to the individual mandate. Indeed, the
Supreme Court denied Congress the power to regulate insurance policies (for
health care or otherwise) until 1944, when it overruled longstanding precedents
forbidding such regulation. See United States v. S.E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533
(1944). Until only the last few decades, there was very little federal regulation of
health care of any kind.
In sharp contrast to the lengthy history of federal involvement at issue in
Comstock, “[f]ederal involvement in health is a fairly new occurrence in U.S.
history.” Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S.
HEALTH CARE POLICY 67 (Praeger Publishers, 1997) (emphasis added). “While a
few laws and special concerns were passed prior to the twentieth century, the bulk
of the federal health legislation that has health impact . . . has actually been passed
in the past 50 or so years.” Id. Indeed, modern health care in the United States
“occupies a completely different place in the economy, in the mind of the public,
and in its impact on the government at all levels than it did 100 years ago, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, or at the beginning of the country in the late
1700s, when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 1.
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The individual mandate does not accommodate state interests.

Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act accommodated state interests by
giving states the option of confining the “sexually dangerous” former prisoners
themselves. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63. Indeed, it even let states assume
custody of the former prisoners and then release them. Id. at 1963. The federal
government could only confine a “sexually dangerous” former federal inmate if the
state government consented to it. And the state can, if it wishes, assume custody of
the inmate in question and immediately set him free. Id.
In stark contrast, the PPACA’s individual mandate applies throughout the
country, even in the many areas where elected state governments oppose it and
would prefer a different system of health insurance regulation. Moreover, states
are not given any right to avoid the mandate or exempt any of their citizens from it.
Significantly, twenty-seven states4 have now successfully challenged the
constitutionality of the individual mandate, a strong indication that many state
governments believe the PPACA runs counter to their interests. Far from
“requir[ing] accommodation of state interests,” the individual mandate runs
roughshod over them. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1962 (emphasis in the original).

4

These include the Commonwealth of Virginia, the plaintiff in the present
case, and twenty-six states who recently prevailed as plaintiffs in a parallel case
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. See Florida v.
Dep’t. of Health & Human Serv., No. 3:10-cv-0091-RV-EMT (N.D. Fla. 2010).
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3. The individual mandate is extremely broad in scope.
Comstock upheld Section 4248 in large part because of its “narrow scope.”
Id. at 1965. It emphasized the fact that the statute “has been applied to only a
small fraction of federal prisoners.” Id. at 1964. In marked contrast, the
individual mandate is extraordinarily broad. It forces millions of people to
purchase insurance products against their will. As the text of PPACA itself
indicates, “[t]he requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market.” PPACA §
1501(a)(2)(C).
The individual mandate clearly fails at least three prongs of the five-part test
laid out in Comstock. The other two do little to strengthen it. Whether Congress
enjoyed “sound reasons” for enacting the mandate is at the very least debatable.
Many economists believe that it is possible to provide coverage for preexisting
conditions without resorting to compulsion on the massive scale undertaken by the
PPACA. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, What to Do About Preexisting Conditions,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009. At the very least, the “sound reasons” underlying the
mandate are not nearly as clear as those supporting Section 4248 in Comstock.
The final consideration outlined in Comstock is the “breadth of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.” Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1965. This factor, however,
is identical in every case. It cannot by itself justify upholding a statute. If it could,
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the other four considerations would be superfluous.
In sum, a majority of the factors outlined in the five-part Comstock test
weigh heavily against the mandate. A fourth is ambiguous at best. And the final
factor never varies from case to case, and therefore cannot be the basis for
upholding legislation on its own.
C.

The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper.”
In order to be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Necessary

and Proper Clause, a statute must be “proper” as well as “necessary.” See Printz,
521 U.S. at 923-24 (holding that a law that is not “proper” can exceed the scope of
Congress’s power under the Necessary & Proper Clause). The Supreme Court has
provided very little guidance on the definition of “proper.” But evidence from the
Founding era suggests that a proper statute must, at the very least, not depend on a
constitutional rationale that gives Congress virtually unlimited power to legislate in
areas traditionally reserved to the states.5 As James Madison explained in

5

See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 215-20 (2003) (discussing the relevant
evidence); Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,
297 (1993) (arguing that the evidence shows that “proper” means that laws “must
be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and
individual rights”); Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895, 921 (2008) (citing evidence that the original
meaning of the Constitution precludes any reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause that has “the effect of completely obliterating the people's retained right to
local self-government”).
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Federalist No. 39, the Constitution does not give the federal government “an
indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39.
The Secretary’s interpretation of the Clause threatens to do just that.
Remarkably, she contends that “[g]overning precedent leaves no room to override
Congress’s judgment about the appropriate means to achieve its legitimate
objectives” where a provision is “rationally related to the exercise of a
constitutionally enumerated power.” Appellant’s Br. at 39, 41. But virtually any
imaginable regulatory measure is “rationally related” to some enumerated power in
some way. For example, a federal statute requiring citizens to exercise every day
is rationally related to Congress’s power to raise and support armies. See U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12. Citizens who exercise regularly might make more
effective draftees. Similarly, a statute requiring individuals to wake up early might
increase their economic productivity by ensuring that they get to work earlier, and
would thereby be “rationally related” to Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce.
The Secretary claims that such a sweeping interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause was adopted by the Court in Comstock. See Appellant’s Br. at
39-41 (quoting Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57). Comstock did indeed indicate
that “in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the
legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the
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statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.” Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57. But the fact
that courts must “look to” the presence or absence of a “rational relationship” does
not mean that this is the end of the constitutional inquiry. The Court also indicated
that assertions of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause are subject
to the five-factor test described above. If a rational relationship were sufficient in
and of itself, Congress would have “a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that the Court affirm
the judgment below.
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